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Since the repression of Falungong in 1999, the question of “cults” has become a 
critical issue in the Chinese religious field, leading Chinese scholars and ideologues to 
elaborate a new discourse on the category of “evil cults” xiejiao 邪教 -- a term from imperial 
times which had fallen into disuse, but was now reactivated to replace the concept of 
“reactionary secret societies” (fandong huidaomen 反動會道門) which had been used in the 
1950’s in the campaigns to exterminate unorthodox religious groups such as Yiguandao. This 
discourse draws equally on references to a genealogy of sectarian rebellions going back to the 
second century CE, and on Western sources on “cults” associated with Christian apologetics 
and the academic discipline of the sociology of religions. This paper attempts to trace the 
contours of the evolution of discourses on stigmatised religious groups in 20th-century 
China – a discourse which has reinvented itself twice, defining itself first within the context 
of revolutionary struggle, and then as part of the contemporary worldwide anti-cult 
movement. Although it was the Falungong case which stimulated the production of the 
contemporary general anti-xiejiao discourse discussed in this paper, this discourse is distinct 
from the specifically anti-Falungong propaganda deployed during the repression campaign, 
which we will not consider here2.   
Unlike the introduction of other modern paradigms such as the science-religion-
superstition dialectic, which led to the tearing apart of China’s traditional cultural fabric and 
to the reshaping of its politico-religious landscape, the use of modern categories to label 
“cults” appears to have only served to mask the redeployment of the classical Chinese 
paradigm of the conflict between the State and the Sect. But the current recourse to 
universalist discourses of the social sciences could, in the long term, have unpredictable 
consequences for the Chinese state’s legitimizing of its anti-cult campaigns.  
The field of Chinese “cults” or “sects” is a mined one, in which it is difficult to draw 
a clear line between a category deployed by the Chinese state’s ideology and propaganda, be 
it imperial or communist, which has always had little relationship with the reality on the field, 
and what appears like a specific and widespread form of Chinese religion which, lacking a 
name of its own, has always been situated outside of traditional China’s ritual and orthodox 
order. To the problem of categorization which already exists in the Chinese language, is 
added a further element of confusion when Western terms such as “cult”, “sect”, “sectarian 
tradition”, “sectarian milieu” or even “new religious movements” are used to designate these 
groups, in spite of all the caveats and well-argued sociological justifications used by scholars, 
including the author of these lines (Jordan & Overmyer 1986; Seiwert 2003; Palmer 2003; 
2005: 421-429; 2006; 2007: 285-290). Indeed, their translation and their use in China has led 
to a new form of “translingual practice”- the invention of new categories based on Western 
concepts which take on a new meaning in the Chinese context (Liu 1995; Asad 1986). 
In the case which interests us here, the Western family of terms “sect”, “cult”, “new 
religious movement”, which make possible a constant and ambiguous oscillation between 
anti-cult polemics and a neutral scientific idiom, lends itself perfectly to the needs of the 
Chinese authorities who, through the elaboration of a discourse circulating between 
ideologues, scholars and officials, seek both to provide an a posteriori justification for the 
harsh repression of some groups, and to develop a more objective understanding of the 
religious phenomenon in order to better manage it in the future.  
 Discourse is not merely a reflection or representation of the reality being talked 
about: by defining and producing the objects of our knowledge, it shapes and orients our 
interactions with the world; it is thus inseparable from the exercise and circulation of power 
(Foucault 1980). The case of xiejiao described here can be seen in two ways. On the one 
hand, we see how the Chinese state has used the production of discourse to control the 
religious field, adapting to changes in ideology and political regime by using different idioms 
(cosmological, revolutionary, social scientific) to elaborate and legitimize an unchanging 
dichotomy between groups that reinforce or submit to the political and ideological order, 
and those which undermine it or cannot fit into it. Thus we can trace the discursive shifts 
which follow the transitions from one regime to another: the late imperial (to 1911), with its 
pretension to integrate the civilized world within a grand cosmic order revolving around the 
Emperor, Son of Heaven, who promoted and demoted the gods within the celestial 
bureaucracy, and under whose protection a plurality of gods and teachings could flourish, 
but in which rival universal cosmologies could not be tolerated; the republican (1911-1949), 
marked by a concern for reinventing China into a modern nation as the solution to foreign 
encroachment and internal instability, and during which the nation’s backwardness and 
weakness was blamed on tradition and superstition; the revolutionary (1949-1979), during 
which all groups not falling under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control were to be 
exterminated; and the reformed socialist (1979-present), in which the CCP attempted to 
reassert its power and authority while leading China towards greater integration with the 
international community.  
 On the other hand, however, the picture is not one of neat and tidy correspondences 
between discourses and historical phases. Discourses linger from one era to another, new 
twists and interpretations arise, elements from seemingly incompatible sources are combined, 
and unexpected affinities come to light, such as Maoist historians inscribing White Lotus 
rebels in revolutionary genealogies, or the contemporary CCP identifying itself with the Qing 
dynasty and Christian orthodoxy. As discourses are constantly adjusted and revised to match 
political and social realities, we also see that they have a life of their own, sometimes 
contributing to unintended reconfigurations. Thus, in the case of the contemporary xiejiao 
discourse, they open an unresolved tension between social scientific relativism, which 
undermines the anti-xiejiao campaigns, and the upholding of Religion as a normative 
standard, which undermines the secular foundations of the socialist State.  
 
The sectarian rebellion paradigm and the problem of the White Lotus 
 
 In traditional Chinese thought, the proper “upright” order (zheng 正) embodied by 
the state (and its Confucian orthodoxy) is opposed by the evil, “crooked” forces of chaos 
(xie 邪). The notion of heresy (yiduan) appears for the first time in the Analects of Confucius, 
which argues that hererodox ideas must be resisted to reduce their menace to society. His 
disciple Mencius used the term in his attack on the egalitarian ideas of Mozi, claiming that in 
periods of decline, when the orthodox way is weakened, “heretical sayings” (xieshuo) 
proliferate and destroy the authority of sovereigns and fathers.  
But it was during the Eastern Han (CE 25-220) that appeared for the first time a 
discourse specifically stigmatising politically heterodox religious groups, following the 
millenarian movement of the Way of Supreme Peace (Taiping dao), whose leader, the 
charismatic healer Zhang Jue, launched the Yellow Turban rebellion in 184, which mobilised 
tens of thousands of fighters and, though crushed after bloody battles, durably weakened the 
reigning dynasty, which collapsed a few decades later (Stein 1963, Seidel 1969-70; Seiwert 
2003: 23-80). This revolt inaugurated the paradigm of the conflict between the state and the 
sectarian rebellion, whose master has the ambition of becoming emperor, destroys social 
order, and threatens the survival of the dynasty: the Chinese state has always had its sectarian 
rebels, and the struggle against them is constitutive of the self-definition and legitimacy of 
the imperial state.  
For the entire subsequent history of imperial China and once again today, the Yellow 
Turbans are invariably invoked to justify the suppression of religious groups judged to be 
heterodox. Later, the rebellions of Faqing (515), Han Shantong (1351), Xu Hongru (1622), 
Wang Lun (1774), the White Lotus (1796), the Eight Trigrams (1813), and the Taipings 
(1851-1864), which were all associated with religious movements, successively enriched the 
discourse on the danger of the “heretical doctrines” or xiejiao.   
Starting in the 14th century, the name “White Lotus teachings” (bailianjiao 白蓮教)  
was often used to designate this type of heretical group, to the point where Chinese and 
Western historiography has long believed in the existence in a “White Lotus sect”, an error 
which has been exposed in Barend ter Haar’s study of the history of the White Lotus (ter 
Haar 1992). Ter Haar shows that a lay Buddhist movement which called itself the « White 
Lotus Society » (bailianhui), which existed in the Song (960-1279) and expanded rapidly 
during the Yuan (1271-1368), was the target of a petition submitted to the imperial throne 
accusing the society of “meeting at night and dispersing at dawn”, “indiscriminately mixing 
man and women”, and “practicing vegetarianism and worshipping demons”. This petition 
led to the banning of the White Lotus by Emperor Wuzong in 1308. But the movement was 
respected by the elites and the edict was revoked five years later (ter Haar 1992: 74). 
However, Zhu Yuanzhang, who founded the Ming dynasty in 1386 with the remaining 
forces of the Maitreyanist rebellion of Han Shantong, and was thus acutely aware from his 
own experience of the potential power of religious movements, in 1397 banned almost all 
forms of popular religious activity – the “heterodox ways” or zuodao – with the exception of 
seasonal sacrifices and a few Buddhist and Taoist monasteries. This law, which can be seen 
as the model and foundation of all subsequent legislation and policy on religion in imperial 
China and to a great extent the Peoples’ Republic as well, specifically bans four named 
groups: the White Lotus Society, the White Cloud Society, Maitreyanism, and Manicheism 
(de Groot 1976 [1901]: 137-148). As ter Haar has shown, from then on the “White Lotus” 
name would become a label which was indiscriminately used to stigmatise lay Buddhist 
associations and eventually any unorthodox group. Xiejiao and “White Lotus” became 
virtually synonymous terms, and no group dared to identify itself as affiliated to a “White 
Lotus” tradition: the history of the “White Lotus sect” since the Ming is in reality the history 
of the usage of the White lotus label and its associated stereotypes to denounce and 
persecute certain groups.   
The end of the Empire and of the discourse on heretical doctrines 
With the fall of the Qing in 1911 and the founding of the republican regime, the 
anti-xiejiao and “White Lotus” discourse seems to have petered out, eclipsed by debates 
around the new categories of “religion” and “superstition” (Goossaert 2003; Nedostup 
2001), and on the place of “secret societies” in the Chinese revolution. In the midst of the 
confusion around these concepts, and of the general political instability, several groups and 
networks which, under the Qing, would have been banned and persecuted as “White Lotus” 
xiejiao emerged from obscurity or formed themselves anew, openly expanding and even 
dominating the religious landscape in some cities and regions. Around the same time that the 
first generation of religious Associations was born in 1912, as described by Vincent 
Goossaert in his contribution to this volume, several of these groups also founded national 
modern-style associations which registered with the state as religious, philanthropic, or 
public interest associations, with a head office, a national organization with provincial and 
municipal branches, and a doctrine which attempted to modernise the Chinese syncretic 
tradition with the aid of a more modern, academic language and by incorporating 
Christianity and Islam to the traditional Union of the Three Teachings. Thus the Zailijiao 
(Teaching of the Abiding Principle) incorporated itself in 1913 as the All-China Association 
for Promoting Abstention from Opium and Alcohol; followed by the Daode xueshe (Society 
for the Study of Morality) in 1916; the Tongshanshe (Fellowship of Goodness) in 1917 ; the 
Wanguo daodehui (Universal Morality Society) in 1918; the Daoyuan (School of the Way)in 
1921 ; The Zhongguo sanjiao shengdao zonghui (Association of the Sagely Way of China’s 
Three Teachings) in 1924 ; the Jiushi xinjiaohui (Association of the New Teachings for 
World Salvation) in 1925 ; the Guiyi daoyuan (School of the Way of the Return to Oneness) 
in 1927, the Zongjiao zhexue yanjiushe (Society for the Study of Religious Philosophy) in 
1930, etc (Shao Yong 1997: 165-194).  These associations, which often had their own 
scriptures, a philosophical system, a simplified ritual, a congregational mode of participation, 
and a hierarchical national organization, actually conformed as much, if not more, to the 
model of the Christian church which had become the new paradigm of “religion” in China, 
than the ancient Buddhist, Taoist or Confucian institutions: it is not surprising, then, that 
several of them obtained the status of religious associations in the first years of the Republic, 
and appear not to have been specific targets of the first waves of polemics against 
superstition.  
The Guomindang nationalist government, established in Nanjing in 1927, was much 
less favourably disposed toward these groups than the Beiyang regime, and the largest 
organizations, notably the Wushanshe, Tongshanshe, and Daoyuan, tainted by their close 
ties with the leaders of the deposed warlord regime, were, in the edict “On banning xiejiao” 
officially outlawed as “superstitious organizations” (迷信機關), accused of being tools of 
warlords and local gentry to increase their influence under the cover of religious and 
philanthropic activities, and of spreading superstition and retarding progress (Lu Zhongwei 
2002: 173-74; She Jingzhen 1997: 227; Lin Benxuan 1990: 325; Wang Jianchuan 1995). 
Rarely applied, the ban seems to have had little effect; many groups counted high-level 
political and military officials among their members. Some groups continued to operate 
legally under the front of their charitable branch, such as the Daoyuan’s Red Swastika 
Society, which drew inspiration from the International Red Cross Society (Nedostup 2001: 
145-153). The relationships between these groups and the Guomindang regime have not yet 
been studied in detail, but the use of the xiejiao label does not seem to have been systematic 
or supported by an elaborate discourse; rather, criticism of the groups was couched in the 
more general terms of the struggle against superstition and against obstacles to progress 
(Duara 2003: 109).  
In any case, the Japanese invasion made it virtually impossible to enforce the 
suppression of these groups. The nationalist regime now gladly approved their charitable 
works; in fact, it began a policy to systematically re-organize, infiltrate and control them as 
tools for anti-Japanese resistance. In Shandong, for instance, each branch in a given area was 
to be renamed as the “self-defense association against the enemy of the XXX society of 
XXX county, Shandong province”, to accept instructions in anti-Japanese defense from 
government agents assigned to work with each group, and to receive regular military training. 
This policy was attempted on the Red Swastika Society and was quite thorough in case of the 
Zailijiao (Lu Zhongwei 2002: 213-216; 234-235).  
In the areas under Japanese control, although some Japanese saw in these 
associations an expression of authentic religion and a means by which Asian spiritual values 
common to Japan and China could be promoted to resist Western materialism, the puppet 
regime in Manchuria was also suspicious of the “superstitious” character of these 
associations. But instead of banning them it attempted to coopt them and make them 
instruments of its social policy: they thus enjoyed unprecedented growth in Manchukuo and, 
later, in the occupied parts of China (Duara 2003: 103-122). 
After the Japanese defeat, as the Guomindang tried to re-establish its control over 
the country, it began to move to suppress Yiguandao, a network of salvationist 
congregations whose worship of the Unborn Mother and apocalyptic eschatology of the 
three kalpas continued a tradition which had been persecuted as “White Lotus doctrine” 
under the Ming and Qing. The Yiguandao lineage had been founded in Shandong at the end 
of the 19th century, but it was under the leadership of Zhang Guangbi (1889-1947) 3 starting 
in the early 1930’s that the congregations began to multiply throughout China, especially in 
the areas under Japanese occupation, of which the minister of foreign affairs was himself an 
initiate (Jordan 1982: 435-462). After the end of the Sino-Japanese war, between 1945 and 
1949, Yiguandao continued to experience spectacular growth, with a presence, according to a 
study of the mentions of Yiguandao in local gazeteers, in 81% of China’s prefectures at the 
beginning of the 1950’s (Fu Zhong 1999: 47). According to police reports in the early 1950’s, 
the number of members had reached 178,000 in Beijing and 140,000 in Tianjin, and even the 
majority of the residents of a large number of villages (Shao Yong 1997: 470; DuBois 2005: 
134). A detailed estimation of the number of Yiguandao members in China remains to be 
done, but if we remember that this growth occurred during a period of only fifteen years in 
conditions of extremely difficult communication during the Sino-Japanese and then civil war, 
the exponential expansion of Yiguandao can be compared to that of Falungong in the 
1990’s – a growth which appeared to go unchecked at a moment when both the GMD and 
the CCP had were struggling to establish a tenuous hold on the nation.  
In Tianjin, where the police acted against Yiguandao and other groups, tracts were 
distributed labelling Yiguandao as a xiejiao, stressing that it descended from the White Lotus 
and the Boxers (Li Shiyu 1975[1948]: 34). The CCP conquest of the Mainland occurred 
before the GMD could do much against Yiguandao, however – a change that, as described 
below, would offer little respite to the movement – but the hostile policy would continue in 
Taiwan. The imperial-era xiejiao discourse was explicitly used to justify the continued 
banning of Yiguandao on the island, with the White Lotus connection repeatedly evoked to 
warn against Yiguandao as a politically subversive group possibly infiltrated by Communist 
agents. This rhetoric was amplified by Buddhist polemics against Yiguandao as a heterodox 
xiejiao, which had begun as early as 1935, and were reiterated in several tracts through the 
1970’s (Li Benxuan 1990: 335).  
Alliances between revolutionaries and “secret societies” 
 If the Japanese had wanted to coopt these “redemptive societies”, to use Duara’s 
term, it was partly to prevent them from going underground and becoming, as in the 
Guomindang-controlled areas, harder to control (Duara 2003: 116). Indeed, while the 
imperial-era anti-xiejiao discourse was only sporadically employed during the Republican 
period, the redemptive groups were increasingly seen as belonging to the ambiguous 
category of “secret societies” (mimi shehui 秘密社會).  
 The discourse on Chinese secret societies goes back to the legislation against sworn 
brotherhoods, which was enacted in the 17th century during the first decades of the Qing 
dynasty. The term used for these groups in legal documents of the time, jiebai dixiong, implies 
the creation of inverted relationships between elder and younger brothers, which was 
contrary to Confucian notions of hierarchy (Antony 1993: 192-193, 206). In the 18th century, 
mutual aid societies based on fictive kinship, which David Ownby calls “brotherhood 
associations”, proliferated in Southern China in a context of social dislocations and weak 
state authority in the region, and evolved a complex form of organization with initiation 
rituals and a secret language, and gave themselves names such as “Father and Mother 
Society”, “Peach Garden Society”, etc (Ownby 1993: 15). During this period, official 
discourse increasingly linked these brotherhoods to banditry and the threat of rebellions, and 
the law became increasingly harsh towards them. Following the rebellion of Lin Shuangwen, 
the first occurrence of the “Heaven and Earth Society” (Tiandihui 天地會) – the notorious 
Triads – in official reports of the 1780’s, treats the group as a xiejiao. But according to 
research by Robert Antony, officials subsequently stopped identifying South Chinese secret 
societies as xiejiao. Thus it seems that what texts called “creating associations and forming 
cliques” (jiehui shudang) constituted, in the eyes of the Qing, a distinct category from that of 
the “heretical doctrines” (Antony 1993: 197, 206). The only thing the two categories had in 
common was the fact that they were seen as threats to social order and potential sources of 
rebellion4.  
Around the end of the Qing regime, both of these types of groups began to be called 
“secret societies” (mimi shehui, mimi jieshe), borrowing the term used by British colonial 
administrators in Malaysia. Indeed, in the late Qing both the brotherhood associations and 
the salvationist societies were illegal and had been driven underground, and were perceived 
as rebellious and opposed to the Qing. We know that Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese 
Republic and himself a leader of the Tongmenghui 同盟會, cultivated relationships with the 
secret societies of the overseas Chinese, and that China’s first revolutionaries heavily relied 
on them to provide troops and mobilise the people. Among some of these associations 
circulated a “nationalist” ideology which called for the overthrow of the Qing (Manchu) 
dynasty and restoration of the Ming (Chinese) ; the radical intellectuals’ task with these 
groups was to convince them to modernise their thinking and support the establishment of a 
republican regime. Thus a new discourse on “secret societies” emerged, which described 
them as proto-revolutionary associations which had existed since the early Qing to oppose 
the imperial regime (Ownby 1993: 6; Borokh 1972).  
During the civil war between the Guomingdang and the CCP, and also during the 
Sino-Japanese war, the three sides tried to enlist the “secret societies”. The communists 
continued to elaborate a discourse on their popular nature and revolutionary potential, which 
was not without ambiguity. On the one hand, in 1921, Chen Duxiu, Marxist intellectual and 
founding secretary-general of the CCP, had written of the Fellowship for Goodness 
(Tongshanshe) that the working and student masses did not believe in these heresies which 
recalled the humiliation of the Boxers and the political oppression and social decadence of 
China (Nedostup 2001: 97). But in spite of this critique of the backward nature of this type 
of association, superstition was not to be an obstacle for tactical alliances : elsewhere, Chen 
Duxiu wrote of the Red Spears (hongqianghui 紅槍會)–  a form of self-defence militia which 
practiced magical invulnerability rites similar to those of the Boxers, and which had millions 
of practitioners in North China (Perry 1982, Tai 1985) – that despite the superstitious 
coloration of peasant thinking, the barbarian and destructive nature of their struggle against 
the ruling classes should not be opposed (Li Shiwei 1996: 198). Zhu De, one of the Red 
Army’s top generals, was also a member of the Elders’ Society (gelaohui) (Schram 1966: 6; 
Smedley 1956: 88-89), and Mao’s thinking was not without a certain romanticism for the 
bandit heroes and wandering knights of the popular novel The Water Margin, whose 
mythology was maintained in the brotherhood associations. In 1926, Mao described the 
secret societies – of which he enumerated a list which made no distinction between 
brotherhood associations, armed militias, and redemptive societies (Triads, Elders’ Society, 
Big Swords, Morality Society, Green Gang, etc.) – as mutual help associations of floating 
populations in their economic and political struggle (Schram 1966: 4). The CCP’s second 
enlarged congress (1926) specifically discussed the question of the Red Spears, and passed a 
resolution stating that “the Red Spears are one of the most important forces in the national 
revolutionary movement”, proposing to give them the means to organize and unify 
themselves in a systematic fashion, and stressing that “we should not oppose the 
superstitious beliefs of the Red Spears. They are the basis on which the association organizes 
and fights. Although they are only relics of ideas which the peasants cannot abandon, we 
must ensure that these superstitious activities are beneficial for the revolution” (Quoted in 
Tai Hsuan-chih 1985: 106).  Ten years later, Mao published an “Appeal from the Central 
Soviet Government” to the “Brothers of the Elders’ Society”, in which he warmly praised its 
anti-Qing tradition and called on them to join the anti-Japanese front (Schram 1966: 11-13; 
Munro ed. 1989: 99-101.) 
But the CCP’s embrace of secret societies was purely opportunistic; the ultimate goal 
was to coopt their leaders and make them useless by creating grassroots revolutionary 
associations which could better meet the needs of the people. CCP cadres did not hesitate to 
establish secret society shrines which were but fronts for Party cells (Chen 1986: 488-492).  
Secret society associations defended purely local interests and could just as well be 
manipulated by the Guomindang and the Japanese: there were clear limits to their 
revolutionary potential. In the Wuxi area, for instance, the Xiantiandao (Way of Anterior 
Heaven) was infiltrated by both the CCP and Japanese – whose praise for the “religious 
faith” of the believers turned into denunciation of the group as a xiejiao deluding the masses, 
once the CCP had managed to spur several of its lodges into violent anti-Japanese action 
(Shao Yong 1997: 378-379). Furthermore, groups like the Fellowship for Goodness, the 
Elders’ Society, and the Red Spears were very different types of association in terms of their 
membership, their structure, their beliefs, their rituals, and their objectives. A thorough study 
of discourses on these groups during the Republican era remains to be done, but it seems, 
based on the sources available, that no fixed category existed: many terms such as banghui, 
huimen, jiaomen, daomen, daohui  were used without systematically distinguishing between them, 
but usually with connotations of shady underground or secret associations. This 
indetermination is the result of the absence of an effective central state during this period 
and of an unstable dynamic in which these groups could impose themselves sometimes as 
potential allies, sometimes as enemies, and thus eluding unilateral objectification.   
Secret societies become “reactionary sects”  
 Everything changed with the founding of the Peoples’ Republic in 1949, and even 
before that in some areas already controlled by the CCP. On 4 January 1949, the Peoples’ 
Government of North China banned secret societies- the huimen and the daomen, stressing 
that these organizations were not only feudal and superstitious, but also “instruments of the 
counter-revolutionaries” and “enemy spies” who “propagate rumours”, “agitate popular 
sentiment”, “organize armed revolts” and “disturb social order”. The leaders of these 
organizations were summoned to turn themselves in to the authorities and to repent if they 
wanted to avoid a harsh punishment. Meanwhile the ordinary followers, who had been 
“fooled” by the reactionary societies, were ordered to withdraw from these associations and 
to cease any activity if they wanted to avoid being prosecuted, and were promised a reward if 
they provided information on these associations and their acts of “sabotage’ (Shao Yong 
1997: 405-406).  
Other regional governments did the same later in 1949. Official discourse crystallized: 
the groups in question became “reactionary secret societies”- fandong huidaomen- this term 
being a conflation of the huimen and daomen; they were to be ruthlessly exterminated in the 
national campaign against counter-revolutionary activities launched at the end of 1950, 
which called for the death sentence or life imprisonment for those who used “feudal secret 
societies” (fengjian huidaomeni) to engage in counterrevolutionary activities. The campaign 
against these groups reached its climax in 1953 and 1954, during which, according to police 
reports, 820,000 leaders and organizers, and 13 million followers were implicated (Shao 
Yong 1997: 452, 455).  
By far the largest of these societies, and hence the principal target of the campaign, 
was Yiguandao, which thus found itself at the centre of the struggle against reactionary 
forces. All forms of propaganda were deployed against it, from editorials and speeches by 
Mao published in the Peoples’ Daily and the rest of the press, to posters, comics, exhibits, 
denunciation assemblies and even theatrical performances. The name Yiguandao became a 
synonym of the counterrevolutionary sect and even a favoured insult used by children in 
schoolyards (Shao Yong 1997: 465; DuBois 2005: 148). One wonders to what extent 
“Yiguandao”, like the “White Lotus” centuries earlier, became a stigmatizing label used to 
demonize any suspect individual or group during the revolutionary fervour, even with no 
real link to Yiguandao. Indeed, according to a Daoist monk I interviewed in July 2004 at a 
temple in Chengdu, the anti-Yiguandao campaign was a pretext to arrest most of that city’s 
Taoists in the early 1950’s, thereby circumventing the “freedom of religion” which was 
supposed to protect Daoism as an official religion. According to newspapers at the time, 
30% of Sichuan’s population was a member of Yiguandao: a fantastical figure which allowed 
one to see the Yiguandao danger everywhere (Deliusin 1972: 232). 
The campaign against the huidaomen and Yiguandao appears to have been largely 
successful : in the region of Hebei studied by Thomas Dubois, Yiguandao was already little 
more than a memory by the end of the 1950’s (DuBois 2005: 148-151). But the “threat” 
resurfaced after the Cultural Revolution, as many societies took advantage of the freer 
political climate to reconstitute themselves. The number of huidaomen cases, most of which 
concerned Yiguandao, dealt with by the police was reported to have increased by  79% in 
1981,  31 % in 1982 and 30% in 1983 (Gong’an bu 1985: 60). The anti-huidaomen discourse 
was reactivated in the press in the first half of the 1980’s. Reports emphasized that the 
groups were organized and recruited followers; they “fabricated apocalyptic rumours”, 
“sabotaged the Four Modernizations”, “proclaimed themselves emperor” and “ambitioned 
to change dynasties”; they “abused of superstition” to “swindle their followers’ money”; they 
“put lives in danger” by “prescribing superstitious remedies”, they “seduced and raped 
women”, “printed reactionary tracts”, “diffused superstition and heresy” and “constantly 
changed activities and methods”, and were “infiltrated” by “foreign forces” including the 
Taiwan Guomindang regime’s spy network (Gong’an bu 1985: 67-80). In a phrase which 
could have been taken directly from Ming imprecations against White Lotus followers who 
“congregated at night and dispersed at daybreak”, huidaomen leaders were said to “keep a low 
profile in the daytime, going out only to call meetings at night” (Gong’an bu 1985: 78).  In 
his study of the Way of the Temple of the Heavenly Immortals (Tianxian miaodao), repressed 
in the 1950’s but which resurfaced in the 1980’s, David Ownby notes that police documents 
reveal an obsession for those group teachings and slogans which could be interpreted as 
signs of an ambition to found a new imperial dynasty, although such allusions, while present 
in the group’s literature, are relatively rare and can be interpreted in different ways depending 
on the context (Ownby 2001: 84-85).  
 Paradoxically, while the anti-huidaomen propaganda repeated many of the same 
themes as the old discourse against the White Lotus, White Lotus rebellions were described 
in generally positive terms in the new communist historiography as part of the revolutionary 
genealogy of peasant revolts against feudal authority and even against foreign imperialist 
churches (see for example Cai Shaoqing 1996[1990]: 203-268). The Yellow Turbans similarly 
became a paradigmatic case of a peasant rebellion inspired by religious egalitarianism. A 
leading historian of peasant rebellions in the 1950’s, Sun Zuomin, argued that heretical sects 
expressed the interests and desires of the lower classes, and opposed the upper-class religion 
which sought to delude the people. Sun considered that such religious groups provided 
peasants with the only effective form of organizational and ideological framework to unite 
the peasantry in the absence of political parties; empowered peasants by giving them a sense 
of mystical invincibility; and, after rebellions were defeated, provided peasants with the 
means for the secret transmission of the ideas and resources of resistance – the latter factor 
being especially evident in the case of the White Lotus, with its repeated uprisings emerging 
from underground splinter groups (Sun Zuomin 1956)5. The role of religion in peasant 
rebellions was the subject of heated academic debates in the PRC in the 1960’s and early 
1980’s, but overall, the “White Lotus” sects of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing were depicted as 
having played a positive role of resistance against feudal domination.   
 It thus became necessary to distinguish White Lotus sects from the “huidaomen” 
societies of the Republican era which, in the revolutionary discourse, had only one objective: 
to defend feudalism and restore the empire (Lu Zhongwei 2002: 7). At the same time, it 
became necessary to reconcile the proletarian and proto-revolutionary origins of the 
huidaomen as described in the socialist historiography, with their current counterrevolutionary 
nature. Thus an internal document published by the ministry of Public Security places the 
huidaomen in direct filiation to the White Lotus, stating that such societies first appeared at 
the end of the Yuan dynasty; then,  
“In the initial period of the emergence of the secret societies, they played a clearly 
progressive role in the struggle against imperialist invasion and the corrupt Qing 
dynasty regime. For example, the famous Boxer movement at the end of the Qing 
was launched with the « White Lotus sect » and the « Red Yang sect » as its 
organizational core. Later, the secret societies were gradually coopted and controlled 
by the reactionary ruling classes, to become counterrevolutionary political groups 
protecting the dominant class at different periods.” (Gong’an bu 1985: 1). 
 
The return of xie j iao  via Christianity and the West 
With the deepening of economic reforms in the post-Mao era, the state gradually 
distanced itself from revolutionary ideology, going so far as to abandon the theory of class 
struggle. In this context, as the “reactionary secret society” label began to seem anachronistic 
and limited to the counterrevolutionary groups of the early years of the Peoples’ Republic, 
the label xiejiao – previously used in the Ming and Qing dynasties – resurfaced and entered 
popular discourse in the mid 1990’s, but this time to translate the term “cult” in Chinese 
press coverage of the tragedies of the Branch Davidians (USA, 1993), of the Order of the 
Solar Temple (Switzerland, Quebec and France, 1994 and 1995), and of Aum Shinrikyo 
(Japan, 1995). In 1995, the State Council and the CCP Central Committee emitted a circular 
banning several groups designated as xiejiao, most of which had been denounced as heretical 
by the official Christian associations: the Shouters (Huhanpai), the Complete Domain Church 
(Quan fanwei jiaohui), the New Testament Church (Xinyue jiaohui), the Oriental Lightning 
(Dongfang shandian), the Assembly of Disciples (Mentuhui), and the Church of Spirits 
(Linglinghui) ; as well as a Buddhist-inspired group headquartered in Taiwan, the Guanyin 
Dharma Gate (Guanyin Famen).  The contemporary reappearance of the xiejiao label is thus 
associated with Christian and foreign groups and translates Western categories of the “cult” 
disseminated by the anti-cult movement which, in North America, is dominated by Christian 
interests.  
At the same time, journalists and scientists who, in 1995, were in a heated polemic 
against the “superstitious” and “pseudo-scientific” deviations of the qigong movement, noted 
the similarities between foreign xiejiao and some qigong organisations, and called for an 
immediate purge of such groups before they became Aum Shinrikyo-style cults and caused 
large-scale deaths (Palmer 2007: 170-172). Following this polemic, the political support 
which had contributed so much to the spread of the qigong movement dissipated, and the 
state attempted to regulate the thousands of qigong associations and networks. In 1998, 
several Buddhist magazines specifically attacked Falungong, which had become the most 
popular qigong form, as a xiejiao which drew lay Buddhists away from orthodoxy, and 
inscribed Falungong in a genealogy which linked it to Yiguandao and the White Lotus 
(Palmer 2007: 262-263; Chen Xingqiao 1998).  Thus, through the combination of scientistic 
polemics and Christian and Buddhist apologetics, a new Chinese discourse on “cults” 
emerged, which resuscitated the old imperial model of xiejiao and the White Lotus and 
combined it with fears of the collective suicides and mass murders of Western and Japanese 
cults. Ironically, this re-appearance of the xiejiao discourse on the Mainland occurred just 
after it had faded in Taiwan, with the end of martial law and the legalisation of Yiguandao in 
1987.  
The PRC’s ministry of public security, which in 1997 had begun an investigation on 
Falungong as an “illegal religion” (feifa zongjiao), lauched a new investigation in 1998, this time 
designating it as a xiejiao (Palmer 2007: 265). Starting on 22 July 1999, when the CCP decreed 
the total suppression of Falungong, the xiejiao label, which had now become a mark of 
political demonization, was repeated ad nauseam in the propaganda campaign which saturated 
the media for several months. Translated in documents published for foreign audiences, 
xiejiao became “evil cult” or “destructive cult” in English and, in French, “secte” or “secte 
insane”6 . Scholars and religious leaders were summoned to conferences in which the 
category of xiejiao was defined on the basis of Western cases, applied to Falungong, and 
distinguished from orthodox religion (Chen Hongxing & Dai Chenjing eds. 1999). On 30 
October of the same year, the state retroactively gave itself the legal instrument of repression 
when the highest legislative body passed a resolution banning xiejiao “which act under the 
cover of religion, qigong or other illicit forms”, and stipulated the punishment of those who 
“manipulate the members of xiejiao organizations to break the laws and decrees of the state, 
organize mass gatherings to disturb the social order and deceive the public, cause deaths, 
rape women, and swindle people of their goods and money, or commit other crimes of 
superstition or heresy”(Decision… 1999).  
 
The new Chinese discourse on xie j iao  
 
A legal framework having been set up, and a flurry of anti-Falungong books and 
propaganda materials having been released, it was now necessary to produce a more 
sophisticated discourse to legitimate the repression and to elaborate a general policy to 
counter evil cults of which Falungong was seen to be but one case of a general phenomenon. 
An anti-cult association of ideologues, scholars and journalists was founded on 13 
November 2000; international conferences of Chinese and foreign “experts” on cults were 
organized; and a large number of works were published from 2000 onwards. In contrast to 
the imperial discourse against “heretical doctrines” and the communist discourse against 
“reactionary” societies, in which groups were condemned according to explicitly political 
criteria defined arbitrarily by the state itself, the new discourse aimed to be objective and 
scientific, defining the xiejiao as a universal category in time and space, dangerous for society 
and humanity in general rather than for a particular political regime. Hence many articles 
drew on the Western sociological and Christian literature to enumerate the characteristics of 
a xiejiao. In the book On Evil Cults (Lun Xiejiao), which collected the proceedings of the first 
“International Symposium on Destructive Cults” held in Beijing in November 2000, the first 
chapter is the contribution, translated into Chinese, of an American anti-cult activist who 
defined the “cult” as a group whose doctrine contradicted that of its mother religion: for 
example, it does not admit the doctrine of the Trinity, of the bodily resurrection of Christ, of 
salvation by grace, etc. The cult uses methods of psychological pressure, forms a totalitarian 
community, its founder is self-proclaimed, dogmatic, messianic, and charismatic, and 
considers that the ends justify the means to make money and recruit followers. The author 
continues by listing the sociological characteristics of the cult: authoritarianism, 
psychological manipulation, psychopathology, breaking of family ties, communal living, 
distortion of sexuality, deprivation, fraud, and deception, and gives psychological 
explanations for joining a cult: the need for love and encouragement, idealism, poverty, 
intellectual satisfaction, health, etc. (Pei Fei 2002). These criteria, which are a basic summary 
of the pseudo-scientific Western discourse on cults which combines elements of Christianity, 
sociology and psychology, were widely referred to, discussed, and debated by Chinese 
authors, often with quotations from the Bible and references to the history of Christianity, in 
the new literature on xiejiao and even in university textbooks and reference works on the 
theory of religious studies or of the sociology of religions (Lu Chunben 2002; Chen Linshu 
& Chen Xia eds. 2003; Sun Shangyang 2001). Other works use psychological methods to 
analyse the “mental control” which Falungong operated on its victims, and evaluate the 
techniques used to reconvert them (zhuanhua)(Zhongguo kexueyuan 2002). Western 
terminology is studied and its Chinese equivalents discussed at length: articles are often 
riddled with English, German, French, Latin and Greek terms -- « kult », « cultus », « sekten », 
« crazed », « destructive », « heresy », « airesis », « secare », « sequi », « denomination », 
« charisma »,  etc (see for example Guo An ed. 2003: 8-13). Indeed, this literature shows a 
great interest for the foreign experience with cults. The work The True Face of Cults (Chen 
Zhiming & Zhang Xiangqi 2001), for example, devotes its first volume to cults abroad (Aum 
Shinrikyo, Branch Davidians, Order of the Solar Temple, etc.) and the second volume to the 
Chinese case (Yiguandao, Shouters, Assembly of Disciples, Falungong, etc.), as if to insist 
that the Chinese experience is but the local expression of a world phenomenon : indeed, the 
introduction to On Cults argues that the trend of cult activities is one of internationalization, 
so that “it is impossible for a single country to stop cultic expansion alone. It is thus 
necessary to reinforce international anti-cultic cooperation” (Shehui wenti ed. 2002: 2). 
Entire books are devoted to anti-cult movements around the world, giving special attention 
to the American and French cases and containing chapters presenting the anti-cult policies 
of countries as varied as Belgium, the Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Guo An ed. 2003: 292-342; Luo Weihong 2002). 
One of the problems encountered by the authors of this literature is how to clarify 
the relationships between the current usage of xiejiao, the imperial meaning of xiejiao, the 
huidaomen of the Republican and Maoist eras, the “new religions” xinxing zongjiao 新興宗教
which also entered the Chinese academic lexicon in the 1990’s, and, of course, the concept 
of “religion” zongjiao itself. In their introduction to a series on Chinese “secret societies”, Qin 
Baoqi and Tan Songlin note that the term xiejiao was used by the Ming and Qing dynastic 
authorities, but should not be used today to label groups from that period, because that 
would imply ignoring their positive contribution to popular resistance to imperial 
dictatorship. Qin and Tan therefore prefer giving them the more neutral term of jiaomen or 
“teaching lineage”. But since the positive value of these groups ends during the Republican 
period, using a neutral term is no longer justified, and the pejorative label of huidaomen 
should now be used to name groups active during that period. Further on, they note several 
commonalities between huidaomen and foreign xiejiao: the political ambition and self-
deification of the master, the apocalyptic doctrines, the corrupt life of the master compared 
to the ascetic denial imposed on followers -- but in order to avoid “conceptual confusion”, 
they insist on the importance of maintaining a distinction between the huidaomen as groups 
active in China in the first half of the 20th century, and the xiejiao as contemporary foreign 
cults and Chinese groups which “raise the banner of Christianity to carry out anti-social 
activities” (Qin Baoqi & Tan Songlin 2002: 2-3, 113-121).  
But overall, even though some historians stress the different social conditions 
prevailing at different periods, the new discourse burdens itself less and less with such 
intellectual acrobatics to separate the various generations of groups having existed under 
different political regimes. On the contrary, xiejiao becomes a universal category including all 
evil cults at all periods of Chinese history and in all parts of the world. The discourse on the 
“positive” contribution of these groups to peasant resistance against feudal dynasties is 
entirely revised: xiejiao masters used their organization and their charisma to coopt and 
exploit popular revolts to further their personal ambition to establish a new feudal theocracy; 
they thus diverted the imperial authorities from gaining an accurate understanding of the 
true causes of popular discontent and provoked all kinds of calamities for common people 
(Liu Xiangyu 2002: 332-334; Liu Ping 2002; Zhao Zhi 2002; Zhang Li 2002). At the same 
time, there is an interest for the methods deployed by the imperial state to exterminate xiejiao 
-- not to condemn the feudal oppression of peasant rebellion, but to glean lessons from the 
past and, in one study, to take inspiration from the successful policy of the Jiaqing emperor 
(1796-1821) against the White Lotus and Eight Trigram revolts (Zheng & Ouyang 2002; 
Zheng Yonghua 2003; Dong Xiaohan & Zhou Yiwen 1999).  
Several articles on the etymology, usage, and history of xiejiao in imperial China have 
been published since 1999 in Chinese newspapers and journals. In a synthesis of these 
studies, Guo An concludes that in Chinese history, it is the government and the orthodox 
religions which defined which groups were xiejiao on the basis of their “anti-social and anti-
orthodox” nature, i.e., that they “opposed the interests of the governing group (tongzhi 
jituan) or “turned their back to orthodox religion” (Guo An ed. 2003: 7). Although the author 
tries to deny making links with the current situation in China, it is clear that the same criteria 
are in operation today, under an alliance between political and religious orthodoxy. Indeed, 
the new discourse on xiejiao gives particular attention to drawing a clear boundary between 
xiejiao and “religion”, and even between xiejiao and “new religious movements”, to such an 
extent that both “traditional” and “new” religions are depicted in a positive light for their 
contribution to social stability. The demarcation line between “orthodox religion” (zhengjiao) 
and xiejiao is not based on heresy in relation to the doctrines and practices of particular 
established religions, but on general notions of moral and social order, almost identical to 
ancient Chinese notions of politico-religious orthodoxy, but this time extended to the whole 
world with the aid of a universalist discourse derived from the social sciences.  
Comparing religion and xiejiao, Guo An lists several differences. On the object of 
devotion, religion worships a transcendental divinity, towards which the clergy are mere 
servants, while xiejiao demand the absolute veneration of a man who himself claims to be 
god. Concerning eschatology, religions do have doctrines on the “end of the world” but 
without a clear date or seen as occurring in a distant future, and busy themselves with 
bringing spiritual encouragement to practical life, so that “traditional religion contributes to 
social stability” – while on the contrary, xiejiao predict the imminence of the end of days and 
try to terrorise their followers with their prophecies. Regarding behaviour, religions 
propagate “ethical and moral values recognized and accumulated by humanity for millennia”, 
while xiejiao force their followers to sacrifice all their possessions and even their family in 
order to put themselves under the protection of their master. Concerning organization, 
traditional religions have an open and “relatively democratic” organization which does not 
contravene the constitution or the law, and the clergy does not intervene in the life of 
believers – whereas xiejiao “establish secret organizations and underground kingdoms, exert a 
dictatorial control on their adepts, practice forced brainwashing”. Finally, in relation to their 
social and political role, the main religions of secularized countries “take the initiative” to 
harmonize their relations with the government and “do not have an anti-governmental 
potential”: all the more so in countries which do not separate between the state and religion, 
where the national religion plays “a crucial role” as a “supporting force” for the 
government – on the contrary, the “evil nature” of the xiejiao is to “destroy social stability, 
slow down economic development and overthrow the government” (Guo An ed. 2003: 36-
42). Though some Chinese authors, following Western categories, consider that xiejiao is a 
form of religion (Dai Kangsheng 1999: 311-315), the consensus –  imposed by the CCP’s 
policy, which on the one hand guarantees the freedom of religion but on the other forbids 
xiejiao – sees “religion” and xiejiao as two diametrically opposed categories:  
« a demon who wears the mask of a beautiful girl is not a beautiful girl ; a wolf 
wearing a sheepskin is a wolf and not a sheep. Xiejiao organizations which drape 
themselves with religious language cannot become religions and can only be xiejiao 
gangs of social criminals. In dealing with the evil forces and social garbage of xiejiao, 
they must absolutely not be considered as religions, nor be given a legal social status: 
they can only be swept into the rubbish heap of history with the iron broom of the 
law. […] Eliminating xiejiao not only has no impact on the rigorous application of the 
policy of religious freedom; on the contrary, given that the xiejiao stain the reputation 
of religion and distort religious concepts, inverting black and white and sowing 
confusion in public opinion, to eliminate xiejiao signifies to respect and to protect 
religion» (Feng Jinyuan 2002: 24-25).  
 
 At the same time, a clear distinction is also made between xiejiao and “new religious 
movements” or “new religions” (xinxing zongjiao), which are beginning to be known to 
Chinese scholars and religious affairs officials since a decade or so, both through 
acquaintance with Western academic  works on this subject and through the introduction to 
China, following China’s greater opening up to foreign contacts, of certain “new religions” 
from abroad. Guo An thus insists that although several xiejiao were originally new religious 
movements, one cannot consider all new religions to be xiejiao. On the contrary, he affirms 
that most new religions remain within the realm of “orthodox” religion and have “an 
internal structure which governs its organization and the relationships between believers and 
the society which, though different from that of traditional religion, “remains within the 
bounds of social norms and morals. As products of “religious secularization”, new religions 
propose a “vision of the future and a worldview adapted to social development, whose 
objective is to enable a given religion to better conform itself to a dramatically changing 
social reality and respond to the spiritual needs of those who are perplexed by this reality”, 
while the xiejiao claim that “one merely needs to join their organization for all one’s troubles 
to be immediately solved” with the sole objective of increasing the number of recruits in 
order to control their minds, their property and even their bodies, which followers 
“completely and unconditionally sacrifice to satisfy the selfish and unspeakable desires of the 
master.” While new religions “practice their teachings by exhorting to do good and by 
bringing benefits to the world, and are constantly developing community applications which 
are beneficial to society in order to gain the understanding and support of society:”, xiejiao 
turn their backs on social morality and the law, and oppose the government, culture, and 
even material life, disdain the existing social order and collective ethics, and constantly 
attempt to use various means to destroy state institutions and threaten the life of the people 
and the security of public property”(Guo An ed. 2003: 51-52). 
  
Conclusion: the end of modern ideology and the elevation of Religion   
 
The importing of two modern paradigms – the revolutionary model in the mid 20th 
century and the social science of religions paradigm fifty years later – appears at first glance 
to have only served to provide new ideological clothing for a category which never changed 
in its essence, that of xiejiao, which became huidaomen in the Maoist period and reverted to 
the xiejiao appellation under Jiang Zemin. But the application of modern paradigms reflects 
an attempt to inscribe the struggle against evil cults into a universal framework: the 
worldwide struggle against imperialism and feudal oppression in the case of the huidaomen, 
and against the international menace of destructive cults in the case of contemporary xiejiao. 
In the second case, however, the recourse to academic institutions to produce social 
scientific discourses, in a context when these institutions are increasingly integrated into 
international research circuits, represents a change in relation to previous situations in which 
the anti-cult discourse was elaborated entirely in relation to the ideological framework of 
Confucianism or Marxism.  
The new Chinese discourse on xiejiao combines traditional notions of heretical 
doctrines with Western elements derived from Christian apologetics, psychology, and the 
social sciences. The result is a xiejiao category which borrows from imperial Chinese ideology 
a concept of orthodoxy based on notions of order and social harmony, of which the state is 
the prime protector with the assistance of religion as an instrument of moral education 
(jiaohua), and from Western discourse a universalist approach which defines “social order”, 
“religion” etc. in general and abstract terms, citing examples from the whole world, without 
giving a special role of arbiter to the Chinese state or to specific religions recognized as 
orthodox in China. While anti-huidaomen propaganda of the 1950’s and 80’s defined these 
groups almost exclusively as a function of their feudal and counterrevolutionary nature, 
without giving much consideration to the relationship between such groups and religion, the 
new discourse places a strong emphasis on the relationship between xiejiao and religion, 
practically defining them as an anti-religion. It is striking to note that, if we recall the central 
role of scientism and anti-superstition campaigns which oriented religious policy in the first 
half of the 20th century7 and which structured the polemic around qigong until the end of the 
1990’s, “science” as an absolute value is rarely called on to discredit xiejiao, and 
“superstition” is not the principal charge made against these groups whose cardinal sin is 
their “anti-social” and “anti-human” nature, i.e. their ambition to destabilize the socio-
political order. The discourse of the struggle against superstition and “pseudo-science” 
which had been the chief weapon of the first polemists to attack qigong and Falungong in the 
mid 1990’s (Palmer 2007: 122-126; 160-162; 170-177), indeed seems to have been 
marginalized since the xiejiao label was officially fixed on Falungong in 1999.  
A general and universal concept of “religion” has thus become the defining standard. 
We are far from the doctrine of religion as the opium of the masses, from the Marxist and 
modernist idea of religion as a relic of the past destined to naturally and gradually disappear, 
and even from the recent admission in official pronouncements that religion will still last for 
a long time. What is significant here is the unambiguously positive evaluation of “religion”, 
of which the “orthodox” nature is understood quite broadly, rarely specifically mentioning 
China’s five official religions and even embracing new religions.  
We can now begin to discern the possible long-term structural consequences of the 
Falungong affair on China’s politico-religious dynamic. Although the Falungong suppression 
campaign uses all the classical instruments of propaganda and repression of a communist 
regime, the discourse on xiejiao which has emerged from it marks a complete rupture from 
50 years of socialist and secularist ideology, a return to the traditional paradigm of the state 
as protector of the orthodox Order against the heretical and demonic forces of Chaos, and 
the entrance of Religion onto the stage as a supportive force for protecting social order and 
the moral and ethical heritage of society.  
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